This piece was written in October 2011. It first appeared in the Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO) volume 7, number 4. You can find it here. 

The sharp rise in piracy in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, has featured prominently in recent news. Piracy as a whole is costing global trade an estimated $12 billion (USD) a year, with the primary target being the oil industry – a key sector of the West African economy – which threatens the strategic interests of the United States, EU, and China.

There are other issues, along with piracy, that are prevalent in the Gulf of Guinea. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the waters of West Africa has been referred to as the ‘worst in the world’, with London-based MRAG Limited estimating illegal catches to be 40% higher than reported legal catches. The smuggling of people, arms, and narcotics is also a significant issue in the West African maritime domain. On top of these issues, a plethora of local and transnational criminal and terrorist organisations are connected either directly or tangentially to piracy in West Africa. Chief amongst them are Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Hamas, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

The Atlantic Council’s November 2010 report on ‘Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain’ highlights the role maritime security issues play in determining the region’s overall level of stability; “Central to West Africa’s high levels of insecurity and instability is the criminal exploitation of its expansive, largely ungoverned maritime domain.” In particular, the security of the West African maritime domain is key in ensuring:

• The unimpeded flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea and the security of energy related infrastructure and assets;
• The safe and efficient flow of vessels, cargo, and people bound to or from foreign ports;
• The absence of a safehaven for transnational terrorist and criminal organisations;
• Political development, sustainable economic growth, and enduring stability in the region as a deterrent to state failure, humanitarian crisis, human rights abuses, and violent extremism.

The convergence of so many security threats within West Africa, and particularly in the maritime realm, requires a multi-faceted, long-term approach. To counter these threats, capacity building operations conducted by private security companies could provide a robust, enduring solution. Such operations would complement, rather than compete with, existing strategies implemented by local governments, foreign governments, and private industry.

Piracy in West Africa has been on the rise since mid-2009, and has spiked sharply over the course of this year. The UN Security Council has recently voiced its concern over the increase, noting an intention to deploy a United Nations assessment team to the region to “examine the situation and explore possible options for United Nations support”. Some analysts have pointed to the widely-publicised success of Somali pirates, and suggested this has directly influenced pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. However, reports have indicated that attacks in West African waters have also tended to be more violent than those off the Horn of Africa, and that many robberies likely go unreported due to the high frequency of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. The recent increase in frequency and severity of attacks has prompted the Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee to raise the threat level of Nigeria, Benin, and neighbouring waters to the same category as the waters off the Horn of Africa.

On the other side of the continent, naval forces from around the globe have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden / Horn of Africa in order to deter pirates, and protect international shipping from attacks. Whilst there have been admirable results from these programs, there are also some notable shortcomings. With the number of merchant ships requiring protection vastly outstripping the assets deployed in theatre, there exists a simple problem – these warships cannot be everywhere they are required at once. Against an asymmetric threat such as piracy, deploying warships in large enough numbers to counter all pirate vessels is simply not cost effective. For example, the cost of the US counter-piracy operation, represented predominantly by the presence of US Navy assets in Combined Task Force 151 and in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, is approximately $64 million per year. Then there are the expenses of other NATO countries, the EU, China, India, and other nations involved to consider. Such expenditure seems excessive for the results achieved.

The role that private security companies can play in protecting ships at sea has been well-documented, and the very high success rate of such is widely known. The value of well-trained, appropriately employed armed contractors cannot be understated; such guard forces are now provided by a number of companies, and can provide a significant deterrent and defence capability to ships’ Masters. Moreover, such an embarked guard force can provide a high level of protection, available at all times, for a reasonable economic outlay. Armed guards do occasionally run into trouble, however. More importantly, as has been widely noted, piracy is a problem that starts ashore.

One model that has shown a promising cost-benefit ratio is capacity building operations. An example of such is Triton International Ltd’s training of the Somaliland Coastguard. Since 2009, Triton has been involved with developing and implementing both training and operations plans for the Coastguard, providing the region of 3.5 million people with a broad spectrum maritime capability, unique within Somalia. To this end, Triton developed a 12-week basic training course for the Coastguard, as well as specialised modules on tactical maritime operations, maritime law, and vessel maintenance. Based out of the ISPS Code-compliant port of Berbera, the Somaliland Coastguard has delivered significant security progress with limited funding and materiel. The Coastguard operates small, fast patrol boats equipped with deck-mounted 14.5mm KPV heavy machine guns.

There have been several measures of success. First, in 2010 alone, the Triton-trained Somaliland Coastguard captured, prosecuted, and jailed more than 120 pirates. Officials in Somaliland have said that pirates rarely cross into their waters from renowned pirate havens in the region due to the Coastguard’s reputation for intercepting them. Second, as a result of these measures, the World Food Program considers Berbera a safe port for the delivery and distribution of food aid destined for the region. Finally, the Coastguard has also intercepted vessels intending to conduct IUU fishing.

The Triton model is cost-effective and efficient, serving as a good example of an “expandable platform”. That is, the Somaliland Coastguard model, if extrapolated to assist some of the smaller, under-patrolled nations in the Gulf of Guinea, could provide these states with the capability to begin countering maritime threats in the region. Many of these smaller nations in need of maritime security assistance have short coastlines, and would require only minimal investment to establish a relatively effective patrol force. For example, Togo’s coastline is a mere 56km long, Benin’s 121km, and Liberia’s 579km. By comparison, Somaliland has a 740km coastline.  Capacity building programs can also gain access to areas – namely the littoral and coastal zones – where foreign defence assets may not otherwise be welcome. By partnering with the host nations or communities in areas of concern, the international community is able to increase its awareness of the threats at hand, and to determine how best to respond to these. Funding sources for such a program could be diverse, ranging from local governments or foreign governments, to shipping companies, international bodies, NGOs, or cultural diasporas.

Private industry is in a unique position to be able to deliver such programs at a reasonable cost, and without placing further demand on the already-strained naval assets of many nations with strategic interests in West Africa, particularly the US. Such capacity building models have distinct national security benefits for foreign powers; the deployment of navel assets required to keep vessels and key infrastructure secure is expensive and inefficient in many scenarios. Capacity building models allow for the development of increased maritime security capabilities that are essential to protecting not only local, but foreign interests. This is especially true when you look at the energy security threats presented by pirates as well as local and transnational criminal and terrorist groups in the Gulf of Guinea.

Capacity building programs represent a very real, scalable approach to countering the numerous maritime threats present in the Gulf of Guinea. Challenges certainly exist, but similar challenges in other regions have been mitigated cost-effectively through an industry-based approach. Such programs are eminently compatible with existing strategies of foreign government-led capacity building, such as the United States’ Africa Partnership Station (APS) program, with local initiatives to bolster maritime security forces, and with the existing private sector practice of deploying armed guards on merchant vessels. With a broad-spectrum approach to the problem, such complementary strategies provide the region with interconnected layers of security in order to deal with maritime threats as comprehensively as possible, and in a cost-effective way.

Further Reading

Advancing U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain – Atlantic Council (John Raidt & Kristen E. Smith)

Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa – Congressional Research Service (Lauren Ploch)

A Mature Maritime Strategy For Africa to Meet National Security Goals – Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University (CAPT Ray A. Stapf)

UPDATE 06/02/2012: Global West Vessel Special Nigeria Limited have been awarded a ten-year, $130 million USD contract for maritime security in Nigeria.
Photo courtesy of warboats.org

Kicking off with the Arab Spring, followed by the deaths (yes, deaths) of Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi, and Kim Jong-il, and ending with the withdrawal of the US from Iraq, 2011 was mind-blowing. Add to that the Eurozone crises, disasters like Fukushima, earthquakes, floods, and volcanoes. 2011 was the year of headlines.

But, in a year of big news, it’s easy to forget the small things. In this case, I’m talking about the first anniversary of this blog, Security Scholar.

One year ago, I met face-to-face with fellow tweeter, @RogueAdventurer aka Nic Jenzen-Jones, in my hometown of Perth. And what started off as a coffee meeting in Cottesloe has grown into a rewarding and productive collaboration with a great friend over the past year.

Security Scholar is the product of our passion for and interest in the security world. It is a place for Nic and I to advance our ideas while engaging with others. Starting as a few scrappy posts from yours truly, I hope it has become a useful source of information and analysis on Australia-focussed global security and military issues.

First, I’d like to thank Nic for his hard work and friendship.

Second, a big thanks to our readership without which we would have little reason for being. Thank you for your patience while I continue to travel through Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia. I have plenty of new material and insight from these travels which will shape future posts.

Third, thanks to fellow bloggers, tweeters and friends who supported us, anyone who endured reading and editing my drafts, and my cats. It has been an amazing year of meeting new friends and colleagues in different parts of the world.

Lastly, gratitude and much respect to those working in dangerous parts of the world, making it a safer and better place. Here’s to another year of headlines. Happy 2012!

Natalie

Note on the photo: While travelling in Cambodia, I noticed a large convoy of soldiers travelling by motorcyle. I quickly snapped a picture as they drove by. I was later told that these were Cambodian police, possibly coming from Hun Sen’s house. It reminded me of this.

As a few of you probably know by now, I’m in the process of undertaking a pretty big research project. I’m attempting to compile a ‘complete-as-possible’ database of small arms used in the recent Libyan conflict. To do this, I’ve been collecting OSINT photos and video stills from a number of media outlets, social networking sites, and so on. I’m also working with some NGOs and PSCs on the ground in Libya, as well as having developed a few local sources of my own.

I have a post up at my personal, more informal blog, The Rogue Adventurer.

I would love any input from readers, particularly detailed photos of weapon receivers (serial numbers, factory marks etc.) or weapon crates, or just photos of unusual small arms that have cropped up. I’m also keeping an eye out for different types of optics that have turned up, for a smaller side project.

Nat’s been pretty active as well. As many of you know she is travelling throughout Indonesia, conducting research on a few different topics and also brushing up her Indonesian language skills. You can follow her most recent adventures on her new blog, Notes From The Field.

Her last few posts have explored the fascinating Balinese ceremonial traditions, showcasing everything from blessings given to firearms to cremations!

As you can see, both of us are still working away. Nat continues to bring us fascinating updates from the field, and I’m up to my eyeballs in picture of unusual firearms that have cropped up in Libya. Business at Security Scholar is just as it has always been – unpredictable, unusual, and fascinating.

In the meantime, don’t forget you can keep track of us on Facebook as well! 

In writing this article I consulted senior DEA Special Agents who have worked extensively with the Jungla commandos in Colombia. Their identities have been withheld by request.

This post originally appeared at Small Wars Journal, here. 

The Jungla Commandos, or Compañía Jungla Antinarcóticos (Counter-narcotics Jungle Company; JUNGLA), as they are properly known, are Colombia’s premier national counter-narcotics (CN) interdiction unit. Falling under the Dirección de Antinarcóticos (Directorate of Counter-narcotics; DIRAN) of the Policía Nacional de Colombia (National Police of Colombia; PNC), the Junglas were formed from 120 men in 1989, with the support of both the US and UK. The first course, in 1989, was conducted with training from the British Special Air Service (SAS), although the US Army’s 7^th Special Forces Group (7^th SFG(A)) provided some behind-the-scenes support and translators. The SAS continued to take the lead until 1991, when US Special Forces took over primary responsibility. In 1998, training responsibility was handed off to the JUNGLA cadre, with ongoing US support.

In recent years, training has been supported primarily by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and US Army Special Forces. DEA agents embed with the Junglas during High-Value Target (HVT) capture and interdiction missions, as well as providing specialised tactical and firearms training, and the US Army provides specialised land warfare training. Funding comes primarily from the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) at the US Embassy in Bogotá. The US Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other US government entities have also been involved in training and providing support for the Junglas. According to sources I spoke with, the Junglas have very little crossover with the Colombian military; however they have conducted some joint operations with the Fuerza Aérea Colombiana (Colombian Air Force; FAC). It is also believed that British MI6 agents (and possibly SAS and SBS personnel) continue to support interdiction efforts in Colombia.

The DEA has a specialised jungle group based out of Colombia that operates with the Junglas, the  Narco-Terrorism/Jungle Operations Group.  The unit is located the Bogota Country Office, and is responsible for DEA activities throughout Colombia. The unit is made up of only seven agents, all with specialised training and/or military experience. Their primary mission is to investigate narco-terrroist organisations such as FARC and ELN.  To this end, members collect intelligence, work cases, and produce intelligence packets for capture operations conducted by the Junglas and/or various other Colombian special operations units. They not only work towards issuing US indictments to terrorist targets, but also embed DEA agents with the Junglas during missions, particularly capture missions targeting HVTs, and interdiction missions, such as targeting cocaine processing labs. This allows the agents to assist in conducting Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and intelligence gathering. The DEA also maintains an indicted list of HVTs, including narco-terrorists, who are constantly on the operational target list of the Junglas, and the wider PNC. One of the DEA agents I spoke with indicated that the presence of DEA agents on the scene during these operations contributes significantly to the success of the judicial process. DEA agents operating in Colombia do not have the power to seize assets or conduct arrests, however they may gather information and collect evidence to be used in US courts, or to support global narcotics seizures. DEA Special Agents regularly share intelligence with the PNC and the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security; DAS*), the Colombian national intelligence agency. *Please see explanatory update at bottom. 

The Junglas’ are primarily tasked with CN interdiction missions, particularly those in jungle terrain, where most narcotics production in Colombia takes place. The PNC’s high-risk urban operations are typically handled by the Grupo de Interdiccion Urbano (Urban Interdiction Group). Interdiction missions typically target processing labs, traffickers, narcotics caches, and stockpiles of precursor chemicals. Additionally, the Junglas often conduct raids aimed at capturing HVTs, including designated narco-terrorists from such groups as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army; FARC), Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army; ELN), and Ejército Revolucionario Popular Antiterrorista Colombiano (Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army of Colombia; ERPAC).

Presently, there are approximately 600 active duty Junglas, divided into three companies, based in the Northern (Santa Marta), Central (Bogotá), and Southern (Tulua) regions of Colombia. There are also approximately 40 members of the Special Reconnaissance Team (SRT), based in Bogotá. This team is comprised of the elite members of the Junglas, and is tasked with high risk reconnaissance, and high risk HVT capture operations. SRT team members have captured a number of HVTs, including Daniel Rendon Herrera (AKA ‘Don Mario’) – Colombia’s most wanted narco-trafficker at the time – in April 2009 , and Marco Fidel Barbara Galacio (AKA ‘Mateo’) in October 2010.

Mission intelligence (‘intel packets’ or ‘target packets’) are developed both internally, and with US assistance. CNP anti-BACRIM (bandas criminales emergentes; ‘emerging criminal bands’) units and units from the Dirección Central de Policía Judicial e Inteligencia (Central Directorate of the Judicial Police and Intelligence; DIJIN) develop intel packets on both HCl labs and HVTs for the Junglas. The DEA and the Military Group at the US Embassy in Bogotá (MilGroup; coordinate DoD CN support) also develop intel packets for the unit. The Junglas also have a special unit of the DIJIN attached to them for the purpose of conducting SSE and evidence/intelligence gathering. Members of this Judicial Police unit accompany the Junglas on all operations.

The Junglas also specialise in destroying jungle laboratories used for cocaine production. In 2007, they destroyed 850 coca base labs, and 62 HCl labs. HCl labs convert cocaine paste or cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride, the ‘crystal’ form of cocaine that is most commonly sold illicitly. The vast majority of laboratories producing HCl are located in Colombia. HCl labs can be detected via aerial surveillance, by developing leads from human intelligence sources (HUMINT), or through other, more esoteric methods such as analysing groundwater seepage for chemical content. In 2009 DIRAN seized 92 tons of cocaine and its derivatives, and approximately 84 tons in 2010. So far this year, DIRAN has been responsible for destroying 813 coca base production facilities, and 100 HCl labs. Full statistics can be found on the PNC’s website.

The Junglas are equipped, largely courtesy of the NAS Bogotá, with some of the latest military arms and equipment. The NAS coordinates equipment and training for the Junglas, with this role being managed by Colonel Kevin Higgins for over ten years, until recently. Sources describe COL Higgins as having had “an enormous influence on the Junglas before he left”. With regards to the types of weapons and equipment issued to the Junglas, one DEA official I spoke with described them as carrying “similar armament to the United States Army Special Forces” in that they are equipped with M4 carbines, M16 assault rifles, M9 pistols, M249 light machine guns, M870 combat shotguns, M60 machine guns, Mk 19 grenade launchers, M224 lightweight 60mm mortars, Night Vision Devices (NVDs), handheld GPS devices, encrypted communications, and E&E (Evasion and Escape) survival equipment. Explosive specialists carry C-4 and other demolitions equipment, snipers carry rifles such as the M24, and so on. A number of photos of the Junglas show them using items commonly found in the M4 Special Operations Peculiar MODification (SOPMOD) Block I kit – AN/PEQ-2 laser aiming devices, Trijicon TA01NSN Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) sights,  Rail Interface Systems (RIS) kits, as well as other modern equipment such as EOTech holographic sights, SureFire M900 series vertical  foregrip-flashlights and so on. Presumably the commonality of equipment between US Army Special Forces and the Junglas enhances the training process. Interestingly, despite this advanced equipment, there are a few recent photos of Junglas using Vietnam-era 20 round magazines with their M4s.

The Junglas are organised into ‘airmobile interdiction companies’; most of their raids and assaults are heliborne operations. Organic air support capacity is provided by the Área de Aviación Policial (Police Aviation Area; ARAVI) DIRAN’s assigned subsection of the CNP’s Servicio Aéreo de Policia (Police Air Service; SAPOL). The INL’s Office of Aviation (INL/A) administers an aviation support program for ARAVI, with contractor personnel from Lockheed Martin and Contracting, Consulting, and Engineering (CCE) monitoring USG-supplied assets and providing logistical and technical support. The US has provided approximately sixty UH-60L Blackhawk and UH-1HII Super Huey helicopters equipped with a combination of M134 (GAU/17A) miniguns and M60 and M240D machine guns. 5cm-thick Kevlar plates are fixed to the floor of many helicopters, increasing survivability versus small arms fire from the ground. ARAVI pilots are widely regarded as being some of the most talented rotary wing pilots in the Western Hemisphere. The Junglas are occasionally supported by FAC light aircraft, including a specially-modified C-26 equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras and other specialist Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) equipment.

The Junglas Course, conducted by a 60-man training cadre in the Junglas’ training base in Espinal, central Colombia, was first established with the aid of the SAS, and then US Army Special Forces. The intensive, four-month course covers advanced land warfare tactics, jungle warfare techniques, skills specific to CN missions, and survival training. DEA trainers have also helped to develop a live fire rapid-reaction pistol and rifle range at the Facatativa base, and have provided advanced marksmanship training to SRT members. Additionally, each attending Jungla commando is expected to specialise in such disciplines as medical training, sniping, or demolitions. Approximately ten percent of all applicants are successful. Selected Jungla personnel may also be invited to attend the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Each year, participants from around the world are invited to attend the Jungla Commando International Course. The quality of this course has been widely acknowledged; participants have attended from the Infantería de Marina Colombiana (Colombian Naval Infantry; Marines) and Armada Nacional de la República de Colombia (Colombian Navy), as well Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala,  Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and, in 2007, Afghanistan.

DIRAN and Jungla instructors visited Afghanistan in 2006 to share their experiences in combating illegal crops and narcotics trafficking with various Afghan CN units, meeting with the Afghan Antinarcotics Minister of the time, Habibullah Qaderi, General Sayed Kamal Sadaat, then Afghan Antinarcotics Director, and various members of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU).  In October of 2010, the Junglas deployed a nine-man Mobile Training Team (MTT) to Mexico to provide 60 days of CN training on topics such as cocaine laboratory destruction techniques, evidence handling, and chemical safety. Argentinean, Paraguayan, and Brazilian nationals also attended this training.

This US State Department cable from October 2009 gives a snapshot of how effective the Junglas can be. In the month covered, the Junglas performed a number of airmobile assaults and raids, killing or capturing several wanted HVTs. Amongst these was a most-wanted FARC criminal, Herier Triana (AKA ‘Patamala’). Patamala was wanted for the kidnapping and subsequent murder murder of the sister of former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, the murder of former senator Jamie Perdomo, and was also thought to be responsible for a series of assassinations committed against a number of town councillors, and a failed plot to kill former Minister of Defense Manuel Santos and his family. In early 2010, the Junglas captured Deiver Luis Durán Caicedo (AKA ‘Morcilla’; ‘Black Pudding’), leader of the BACRIM group ‘Los Urabeños’, who had a 250 million Colombian peso (COP) reward on his head.

When I asked one of the DEA agents consulted for this piece where the Junglas fit into the overall interdiction strategy in Colombia, he had this to say: “They are at the top of the list. They are the best in the country and the most specialized, self sufficient unit for interdiction.” He went on to explain that US financial support is now more important than operational support, with the unit having received so much training  from the DEA and US Army that it is essentially self-sufficient. A 2008 State Department cable notes that “The high degree of self-reliance and superb Jungla training regimen make the Junglas one of the Embassy’s most effective and nationalized programs… the many Jungla contributions to antinarcotics efforts, both in Colombia and on the international scene, demonstrate the high return that this sustained USG investment continues to yield.”  It is clear that the Junglas are extremely successful, certainly the most successful CN unit currently operating in Latin America.

You can download a copy of this S3 summary in .PDF format by using the controls above.

Update 08/12/2011: During the course of writing this piece (on October 31, 2011), the Colombian government signed Decree 4057, which “suppresses the [DAS] and transfers some functions to other state bodies”. You can  find details at the DAS website, here (Spanish). 

Security was tight. With the dozens of beret-clad and armed POLRI, squads of the special reaction unit (Gegana) dressed in black, military police, army, and rooftop snipers, journalists and onlookers were more concerned about getting on their wrong side that morning than of any terrorist attack.

However, once the Australian Prime Minister arrived to pay her respects to the victims of the 2002 Bali Bombing, all eyes were on her. In Bali for the ASEAN and related summits, the PM’s visit to Ground Zero was a small yet symbolically important part of her tightly-packed schedule.

Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relations have had a number troughs over the past twelve months. A few days ago, Indonesia’s foreign minister and military chief voiced their respective concerns about the newly-announced initiative to place US Marines in Darwin from 2012 (with the FM noting he’d only been told informally a few days prior to the announcement). Add to that a Prime Minister who has publicly stated that foreign affairs is not her forte, failed to coordinate with her Foreign Minister on policy changes, and announced asylum seeker initiatives without alerting the countries in question.

Nonetheless, the visit to the Bali Bombing Memorial—simple and brief as it was—shows a willingness to engage in ground level aspects of the bilateral relationship. Several locals around the scene expressed a positive reaction to her efforts. The coverage by BaliTV would have further relayed the PM’s message of solidarity and respect into the homes of Bali viewers.

The visit also signals a level of trust in the security provided by Indonesian forces and intelligence services. Since the 2002 bombing, Indonesian authorities have expanded their capabilities through joint training with foreign partners, intelligence coordination, legal reform, and the establishment of counter-terror police unit Densus 88 (Detachment 88). If business in Bali and the January arrest of terror suspect Omar Patek attest, benefits are being reaped.

After laying the wreath at the Memorial, the PM spoke to some Australian tourists. Australian officials asked if I could say a few words to her about the lives of Bali locals after the 2002 bombing so I was included in the group. It would have been better had she spoken to some locals directly (even via translator) but such exchanges are not always easy to organise. That said, engaging with Australians here and asking them about their Bali experiences (apart from having good political mileage) would have left her with some impressions of the island through Australian eyes.

President SBY may never be ‘bapak’* to Gillard as Suharto was to Keating, and there are still many aspects of Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship that remain under-explored. Nonetheless, here was PM Julia Gillard, in Bali at Ground Zero, having a go.

*trans. ‘father’ but also a term for respected older man

From the top of the Bali 2002 Bomb Memorial, two snipers (above) kept watch while Prime Minister Julia Gillard and other officials paid their respects yesterday morning.

Dressed in black, complete with facemasks, the snipers were most likely from Detachment C (anti-terror) of Gegana, a branch of Indonesia’s special operations police force (BRIMOB) and ostensibly tasked with police special operations duties.

A few quick facts about the unit:

• The unit was formed in 1976 with a focus on anti-hijacking. The name Gegana is derived from the Sanskrit word ‘gegono’ meaning ‘sky’, relating to these duties.[1]
• According to senior police officials, members of Gegana must be trained in a range of skills including negotiation and sniping, however all must be well-versed in bomb defusal.[2]
• As of July 2011, Gegana has its own style of hand-to-hand combat that is a blend of several martial arts with the aim of to “train[ing] its Detachment members to build a combative spirit, very fit well being, strong esprit de corps, develop warrior mentality and overall combative skills.”[3]
• Besides being out in force on the day of PM Gillard’s visit to Bali Ground Zero, Gegana have also secured the Australian Consulate-General office in Denpasar Bali in early October.[4]

Some of the information in this update was provided by a KRISS SYSTEMS spokesperson, in response to my queries.

The KRISS K10, discussed briefly in my earlier piece here, represents the evolution of the KRISS Vector SMG. The K10 will be designed as a multi-calibre platform, supporting .45 ACP, 9x19mm NATO and .40 S&W. These three calibres are the most popular handgun cartridges in Western military and law enforcement use. The lower receivers will be interchangeable, allowing operators to easily switch between calibres, should they desire. The new submachine gun will also feature a quad-Picatinny rail fore end, giving the firearm a lot more flexibility for mounting aftermarket accessories.

The K10 will, of course, be based around the KRISS Super V System (KSVS), making use of in-line design and asymmetrical recoil (the ‘vectored bolt’ technology) to greatly reduce felt recoil and muzzle climb. The K10 also features a much larger charging handle (that can be reconfigured to suit left or right handed shooters), a telescoping, five-position stock (unlike the Vector’s folding stock), an ambidextrous magazine release on the fore grip, and a muzzle designed to accept KRISS DEFIANCE series suppressors. A proprietary magazine is also being developed, and this will reportedly be interoperable with another KRISS weapon under development, the KARD. Limited information on the KARD can be found here, and here. I have been informed that the KARD is an ongoing project, and that no date has been set for its release as yet.

A KRISS SYSTEMS spokesperson has confirmed that the K10 will be released next March, at IWA 2012 in Nuremberg, Germany. I have also been informed that there are existing law enforcement and/or military pre-orders for the system, and that the K10 will be first released in .45, with .40 and 9mm to follow.

KRISS SYSTEMS are also releasing a new compact handgun under their Sphinx brand. The Sphinx SDP Compact in 9mm was presented at Milipol 2011 in Paris, last month, and will be officially released at SHOT Show 2012 in Las Vegas, in January. The Sphinx literature describes the SDP compact as an “all black pistol in Double-Action/Single-Action with an ambidextrous decocking lever and magazine catch featuring six safeties”. Interestingly, the pistol also features interchangeable grip inserts not only in a variety of sizes (S/M/L), but also in different materials (hard polymer, and softer rubber). The SDP Compact also features DEFIANCE’s combined fibre/Tritium front sight, and accepts compensators and DEFIANCE suppressors. You can find information on both here.

K10 photo courtesy of Defense Review. Please note that the photo shown is a prototype displayed at SHOT Show 2011, and does not represent the final production version of the K10. 

Sphinx SDP Compact photo courtesy of KRISS SYSTEMS SA. 

I stumbled across the sole post on this almost vacant WordPress site this morning. It features photos which show close-up detail of an AK-103, apparently from Libya. These are the first photographs I have seen that show sufficient detail of the receiver to conclusively establish the provenance of the weapons in question. These images, along with the evidence shown in the last update, lend more weight to one of my original speculations that these weapons were exported to Libya from Russia.

The receiver bears the designation ‘AK 103-2′, indicating that the weapon features a three-round burst function. More tellingly, to the left of the serial number, on the trunnion, can be seen the factory marking of the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant, or IZHMASH (ИЖМАШ), an upright arrow inside a triangle. The serial number, beginning with the two digits ’07′, indicates that the rifle was manufactured in 2007.

We can now confidently conclude that at least some of the AK-103 rifles seen in Libya were manufactured in Russia.  What remains to be seen is how many rifles were purchases from Russia, and whether or not the proposed USD $600 million factory to manufacture the AK-103 under license has been made, or will be made, operational.

Update 05/11/2011: I’m curious as to how many of the 103s seen in Libya are 103-2 variants. If anyone has, or finds, photos from Libya showing receiver detail, please contact me.

Update 30/11/2011: @blabeen, a former Major in the Libyan Army who defected to the rebels’ side, has let me know that he has seen “many” AK-103s, and that all of those have been 103-2 variants. He also notes that the AK-103-2 is known locally as ‘the Israeli Kalashnikov‘. This is quite odd – no word on why as yet. 

Update 05/12/2011: You can read about weapon optics of the Libyan conflict, including models spotted on AK-103s, at my personal blog. 

Detail of the serial number, designation, and factory mark.

Photos courtesy of libyanproud.wordpress.com

Over the last few weeks I have been in correspondence with various officials from Defence, discussing the specifics and the impact of the upcoming Australian MultiCam Pattern (AMP). This new pattern is being developed by Crype Precision for the ADF – you can read more about this in an earlier Security Scholar article, here.

The following is a series of official responses from an ADF spokesperson to some of my questions:

Will the new AMP pattern follow the British MTP example and feature Crye’s MultiCam palette with a modified design, or are the colours being adjusted in any way?

Response: The prototype pattern has retained the Crye Multicam palette as it is these colours that have proven to be effective in Afghanistan. During the testing of the Australian Multicam Pattern Defence will confirm both the pattern and the palette meet the requirements for Afghanistan as well as examining what changes, if any, would improve its performance across the range of environments where Australian troops are operating.

Will AMP be tested prior to manufacture of new uniforms, or is considered similar enough to MultiCam that further testing won’t be necessary?

Response: Testing in a range of representative environments is already underway.

Will the new Operational Combat Uniform be manufactured from flame-resistant fabric and, if so, have you addressed concerns with the durability of this material?

Response: The fabric for these uniforms will be manufactured in Australia. Defence has received responses from Australian industry as part of the Invitation to Register Interest that was recently released and this information is being used to inform the decision on the final uniform configuration. Concurrently Army Headquarters has tasked the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to analyse the use of flame retardant materials in combat uniforms to determine if there is an operational need for these types of fabrics.

Will AMP pattern uniforms be issued to troops serving outside of Afghanistan?

Response: The pattern has been procured to meet an operational requirement for Afghanistan as a result of user feedback from the Special Operations Task Group and more recently Mentoring Task Force 3. Defence will examine its suitability in a range of other operational environments and this information will be used by Defence to determine its future requirements.

There are a few interesting points to take away from this. Firstly, we can confirm that the AMP pattern will follow the British Multi-Terrain Pattern (MTP) in featuring Crye’s familiar colour palette, with a slightly modified design. I anticipate that, like the British did, we will modify the design so that it is more reminiscent of our existing (DPCU/DPDU) camouflage patterns. Secondly, testing is apparently already underway in a “range of representative environments”. No word on what the breakdown there is, or on the testing methodology, but the results will certainly be interesting. Thirdly, I’m surprised that the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) has been “tasked to determine if there is an operational need” for flame-resistant fabrics – I would have thought this had been covered already. No word yet on the durability of any proposed fabrics, though I trust this will be taken into account due to the recent issues with Crye uniforms. Finally, it is interesting to note that there are no plans – at this stage, at least – to issue AMP uniforms to troops serving outside of Afghanistan.

Update 21/10/2011: Soldier Systems Daily has added a little more to the picture, citing our article here. They note, in relation to durability issues with FR fabrics:  ”It seems, the Australians specified an older blend of TenCate’s Defender-M fabric. A newer version with twice the tear strength has been in use by the US Marine Corps for well over a year and for the last few months by the US Army.” With any luck, the DSTO will quickly conclude that fire-resistant fabrics are rapidly becoming the norm in modern combat uniforms, and fast-track the transition to newer, more durable FR fabrics.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defence

For the next two months, I will be travelling through and writing from Indonesia; the first stop on my itinerary was Bali.

Bali is a bustling place right now: the traffic flows, the tourists chatter, the smiles are abound, and there is general busy-ness in every direction. Even the surfer dogs are upbeat. But nine years ago, it was not always like this. Today, we commemorate the ninth anniversary of the first Bali bombing that took place in 2002; an explosion that tore through the Sari nightclub on a busy Saturday evening, claiming 202 lives and injuring 240.

I spend most of the day around the bomb memorial—a magnificent Hindu carving in the wall where the nightclub once stood, with bouquets of flowers hugging its base. My aim is to get a ground-level snapshot of how life goes on a day like today.

I speak to several Indonesian people living in Bali. There are many mixed emotions. Some affirm how much life has “returned to normal” and how safe they feel; others revisit the trauma of that night and the apprehension they still experience.

One particularly loquacious man, Erwin, the owner of a tour company, chats to me at length about the security situation. He explains that he feels safer, particularly with the development of counter-terrorism capabilities of police special operations units such as Densus 88 and BRIMOB. He believes that these groups are highly capable, having been trained by the US’ DEA and CIA, and by Australia’s AFP.

However, in line with recent calls by Indonesian President SBY, he agrees that he would feel more comfortable if the military provided more counter-terrorism support. In his opinion, there is simply more trust in the military as, after all, the operation that led to the discovery and arrest of a terrorist group in Aceh was supported by Kopassus (an opinion that I’m not entirely sure is grounded in fact).

Wayan S was working at a restaurant not too far from the Sari club in 2002. He changed jobs after the restaurant lost all its business after the bombing. He now works at hotel bar right near the memorial (where I buy my “teh panas dengan susu manis” everyday); a hotel that was completely destroyed by the explosion and rebuilt thereafter.

He tells me it was particularly traumatic for his boss who lost several friends in the blast. According to Wayan, it is still heart-wrenching when photos of the bombing are shown or the topic is brought up. To illustrate the extent of the devastation, Wayan pulls out a small album of photos taken the day after the bombing. With so many pieces of buildings are strewn around, they looked to me as though they were made from matchsticks and paper.

I speak to some young shop assistants who were either still in school or just finishing their studies around 2002. Several of them give frank yet brief answers to my questions. Some believe that the increased security and police presence makes them feel safer yet they still get a slight panic when there are crowds of tourists around.

One middle-aged man, Made, who worked in a travel business in 2002 around the corner, came rushing to scene of the bomb when it exploded. He said it was a shocking scene with bodies lying everywhere. He rushed several victims to hospital with his car. One of his passengers, an Australian man from Melbourne named Mark, suffered a broken arm and broken leg. Made and many others did not sleep at all for a while. While life has returned somewhat to normal for Made (he still works and lives in Bali as before), he experiences a sense of trauma about the Bali bombing. Meanwhile, Mark came back to Bali around one year ago to track down Made and thank him for his help.

Two shop owners on Jalan Poppies II tell me that, despite the increased security in Bali, they still do not feel completely safe; as long as tourists flock to Bali, they feel it is an easy target for terrorists. Other incidents such as the recent bombing in Solo and attacks on Indonesian police officers throughout the archipalego seem to affirm to them a level of danger replete with their sense of apprehension. Although they are further down Poppies II, away from the Sari club, they point to the rooves of their shops, explaining to me that pieces of hand and scalp landed there after the explosion.

The sun was setting over the ocean as I write this from Bali. I recall a scene from earlier today: several helmet-clad, weapon-laden police officers from the bomb-disposal unit, Gegana, escorted Japanese embassy staff to the memorial. Traffic was stopped. An awkward, hurried commemoration was held before they were ushered back into their SUVs and driven away. Memories, however, cannot be whisked away so quickly. They remain, and we will remember.

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