I think a bit of context needs to be given to the ABC’s report, ‘Indonesian President vows to outgun Australia‘. Published the same day our new Defence White Paper (PDF) was released, the story’s headline made Indonesia look particularly hawkish. I’d like to offer my thoughts to clear up what Indonesia’s military modernisation is and isn’t about.

First, let’s look at the expanded version of what President SBY actually said (apologies for any errors in translation):

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is non-negotiable. Our military forces must be larger and more modern than neighbouring countries, like Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and so on. Given our vast country, the Indonesian military forces must absolutely be larger.

This isn’t about Australia. Not only did SBY not single out Australia, his statements were about reassurance, not threat. What he said makes more sense when you consider SBY, a former general, was speaking at Latihan Gabungan 2013 (a joint military exercise involving 16,000 troops) in front of a large military crowd and, in the lead up to the 2014 presidential election, he was reaching out to a domestic audience.

Looking at its strategic circumstances, it also makes sense for Indonesia to have a bigger military. It’s a vast archipelago with different strategic priorities, the most pressing of which are sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it’s in dire need to boost air and naval capabilities.

Paragraphs 3.16 and 3.17 of the new Defence White Paper indicate that a cohesive and stable Indonesia is vital to our security. For one, we don’t want hostile actors to project power against us from Southeast Asia therefore, as Indonesia grows stronger and more capable militarily, there will be security dividends for the region.

In any case, Indonesia’s military modernisation still has a long way to go as it progresses from a lower capability level and is building up indigenous technological expertise required for high-end capabilities. Furthermore, the history of military involvement in politics still has implications today for the levels of professionalism and conduct within the forces. Indonesia’s military has reformed to an extent, but there’s still the question of transforming into an effective defence organisation (PDF).

The bottom line is Indonesia is busy sorting out its own house. These kinds of statements might be an editorial whim, but they belong to a broader context. So before we get anxious about who’s got the bigger military, let’s remember that it’s not always about us.

Image credit: President of the Republic of Indonesia

Video here.

Image credit: Agence France-Press via Jakarta Globe

Nelson rightly identifies Indonesia as attempting to pursue a ‘conduit’-type role. In fact, to be an effective conduit and exert real influence on the US and China, Nelson prescribes Indonesia build goodwill as a conflict mediator and regional problem-solver.

In theory, it’s a sensible option but I have my misgivings about how it’s presented in relatively unproblematic terms. I say this because I’m reminded of comments made at a recent workshop by a participant challenging Indonesia’s image as a neutral party in South China Sea disputes. They asked, how could Indonesia be a legitimate mediator if it refuses mediation itself on issues such as the Natuna Islands?

Not being an expert on Indonesia’s territorial disputes, I dug up some of I Made Andi Arsana’s writing to work out how much of an issue Natuna is. Arsana’s overview of the history around the Natuna Island EEZ reveals a complicated picture (excerpt):

On the other hand, China seems to have a different view. In 2010, for example, Chinese fishermen were caught fishing in waters off the Natuna Islands, which Indonesia unilaterally considers as part of its EEZ. When patrolling Indonesian officers approached to arrest the vessels, a large Chinese vessel arrived and demanded that the vessels be released.

This gives the impression that the fishing vessels were guarded by a large vessel known as the “Chinese fishery administration vessel”. It can be inferred that China has extended its maritime claim up to the area that Indonesia believes to be its.

The aforementioned incident implies that Indonesia is not totally free from the SCS conflict.

Nelson approach isn’t incorrect but it requires more detail than its current form to be a true representation of Indonesia’s strategic options. It might be strengthened by addressing questions about China–Indonesia strategic relations, found in other writings of Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Greta Nabbs-Keller, to name a few. With reports earlier this year of the Indonesian navy on alert for possible Chinese claims to Natuna waters, it seems like this isn’t over yet.

Here’s my latest post on The Strategist, and kudos to the executive editor for letting me keep the phrase ‘dropping the mic’. 

One of the main features of the Indonesian President’s speech to last week’s Jakarta International Defense Dialogue was the concept of ‘strategic trust’. Admitting this was difficult to define, he referred to it as ‘an evolving sense of mutual confidence between nations – particularly between government and militaries’ that enables parties to work together more effectively and, more importantly, peacefully.

President SBY offered two examples from Indonesia’s own history where strategic trust has been the glue in otherwise shattered relationships: between Indonesia and East Timor (a poignant reference given East Timor’s PM Xanana Gusmão was sitting in the audience), and between the Indonesian government and GAM in Aceh. His message is that it’s something that can bring bitter enemies together very gradually over time, ‘brick by brick’, and it has to reach from top leadership to the bottom rung.

It’s not a particularly radical concept, and it has been bounced around before. But what President SBY has put in words is, for instance, what Australia is seeking to build with regional partners. If we were asking ourselves, ‘what does it take to be strategic partners with Indonesia?’, SBY has got an easy answer: ‘strategic trust’, as it’s understood in Jakarta. And that’s the beauty of abstraction: you’re off the hook proving it in quantitative terms but you certainly can say you’re working towards it.

The President gets further mileage from a term ‘strategic trust’ because it’s entirely consistent with the back catalogue of Indonesia’s regional and international proclamations. Strategic trust is an extension of Indonesia’s foreign policy of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ and its diplomatic approach of having ‘a million friends and zero enemies’. It continues to affirm Indonesia’s desire to be seen as a balancer within the region, not only between global and emerging powers, but also between Asia–Pacific partners. It comes as no surprise that the President would cite opportunities for strategic trust-building as areas where Indonesia has been active diplomatically: in Myanmar’s democratic transition and the South China Sea Code of Conduct.

The speech might not be ground-breaking but it’s clever for slipping a diplomatic buzzword into a forum like JIDD. There’s no doubt ‘strategic trust’ was whispered around the JIDD stalls throughout the day and after. Media coverage of the event has played up SBY’s speech like he was ‘dropping the mic’ on strategic thinking. But at the end of the day, ‘strategic trust’ is a term that, if incorporated into our everyday diplomatic parlance and practice with Indonesia, wouldn’t be a bad thing.

Image source: President of the Republic of Indonesia. 

If you’re looking for an Indonesian perspective on the US pivot, check out Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s NBR and Asialink essays. Her NBR essay, in particular, sees the pivot as reversing the perception that the US neglected Southeast Asia during the Bush years. According to DFA, it was a time when ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific partners could develop new relations between themselves to manage China’s rise. But since then, as China has swung its weight around in unfavourable ways, the region (including Indonesia) is glad the US is ‘back’, so to speak.

In terms of the pivot’s substance, DFA notes Indonesia’s concern that too much emphasis on the military dimension risks stoking regional tension (something that Ashton Carter addressed in his Jakarta International Defense Dialogue speech this week). DFA explains that the Marines in Darwin are close enough to the US-owned Freeport mining operations in Papua to raise suspicions of intervention. She concedes this is highly unlikely but cites past US and Australian interference across the archipelago as the historical background for this fear.

These messages are reiterations of Indonesia’s foreign policy and strategic positions, particularly with regards to hedging great powers and promoting regional cooperation. The utility of DFA’s essays therefore is to provide Australian and American audiences with an account of Indonesia’s official perspective (she’s still, after all,  Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President). As time goes by, and proposals like the HADR exercise between Australian-Indonesian-American forces come to fruition, there’ll be a greater indication of how the pivot has played out for Indonesia, but until then, watch this space.

RAF Regiment gunners, aboard a RAF C-17ER, in front of a French VAB SAN (armoured ambulance variant). Credit: AFP.

Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment troops, possibly based out of Honington or Wittering, have been deployed to Bamako as a force protection (FP) element for RAF operations in support of the French intervention in Mali. France’s Opération Serval is being supported by two RAF C-17ER transport planes, operated by No. 99 Squadron from RAF Brize Norton. These aircraft are to ferry French armoured vehicles from the Évreux-Fauville Air Base in France, to Bamako.

Whilst the British government has claimed there will be ‘no UK boots on the ground’, that is not strictly true. In this video, RAF Regiment FP elements can be seen at Bamako Airport with a range of field kit, small arms, and other equipment. The RAF tactical recognition flash and RAF Regiment ‘mudguard’ badges can be clearly seen (see examples below). French VAB (Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé) series armoured personnel carriers are unloaded from the C-17ER. RAF regiment gunners fought alongside US Marines during the insurgent attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan, last September. The attack left two US Marines of Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) dead, 6 AV-8B Harrier II ground attack aircraft destroyed, and two more damaged. Members of No. 5 RAF Regiment Force Protection Wing and elements 2/10 Battalion US Marines then fought to regain control of the airfield, capturing one insurgent, and killing fourteen others.

The deployment of limited FP assets as seen in Bamako is standard procedure, and certainly does not constitute a British commitment to combat operations in Mali. Nevertheless, the British government has been less than transparent about these measures. In a 14 January sitting of the House of Commons, Bob Stewart (Conservative Member for Beckenham) asked:

“The House totally understands that no combat troops will be deployed, yet technical personnel will be sent to Bamako airfield to service the large aircraft that will presumably bring in equipment such as tanks. When those aircraft land, will those technical personnel include force protection personnel, possibly including personnel from the RAF Regiment, who are actually soldiers?”

Mark Simmonds, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, responded:

“I thank my hon. Friend for his question. The capital of Mali is pronounced “Bam-ack-co”. Just to clarify the matter, there are currently no plans for NATO to be involved in Mali. The EU has drawn up a mission comprising 400 men, about 250 of whom will be force protection, and they are due to deploy later in the year. My hon. Friend asked a specific question about the number of military personnel who will be there to operate and to defend, if necessary, the aircraft when they are in Bamako. I will have to let him know about that.”

It seems strange that the British government would not be as open and transparent as possible with regards to the FP measures being undertaken to secure RAF assets in Mali. One would think the British public would be reassured to know that the appropriate security elements are in place, whether that technically means combat troops on the ground, or not.

My thanks to Aris Roussinos for his assistance with this piece.
RAF Regiment recognition flash (credit: Wikimedia) and ‘mudguard’ (credit).
RAF Regiment gunners landing in Bamako. Credit: ITN Source.

26 September, Canberra:

Australia’s leaders from both sides of politics have been paying greater attention to Indonesia; there’s been more official engagement, as well as new diplomatic and defence initiatives in the past year. And we’ve been describing Indonesia, as our Defence Minister has during his Jakarta visit last week, in more important terms like ‘strategic partner’.

But it looks like that there’s some way to go before ‘strategic partner’ becomes more than just a term of endearment. If we look at the 2009 Defence White Paper (for the time being still the government’s defence strategic policy), we find a curious ambivalence towards Indonesia. According to the White Paper, we have a ‘fundamental interest in controlling the air and sea approaches to our continent’ (paragraph 5.5). But in reference to a secure immediate neighbourhood, it says we should prevent or mitigate ‘nearby states [from] develop[ing] the capacity to undertake sustained military operations within our approaches’ (paragraph 5.8). There’s a contradiction there; as Hugh White notes in his Security Challenges essay (PDF), it may very well be those same capabilities Indonesia requires to ensure its own security in its northern approaches that could be instrumental in both Indonesia and Australia securing their strategic interests.

In short, the language of the 2009 Defence White Paper simply doesn’t match our statements of Indonesia as a strategic partner. And although there are asymmetries in our capabilities, a strategic partnership means allowing and encouraging Indonesia to grow in a way that complements our strengths and compensates for our weaknesses so that we can work together; if Indonesia is to play an important role in our strategic future, then actively mitigating or preventing particular capacities isn’t the way to go.

This position might have been justifiable in white papers released after Konfrontasi (during which Australia and Indonesia found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict) or shortly after the 1999 East Timor intervention, during which relations with Indonesia were more fractious and the military (TNI) was only just exiting Indonesian politics. But times have changed.

On the domestic front, Indonesia is a much more stable, democratic state. In economic terms Indonesia is now starting to flex its muscle. Its GDP grew by an annualised 6.4% in the second quarter of 2012, its economy is now larger than Australia’s in purchasing power parity terms, and its middle class is larger than Australia’s population. TNI no longer exerts the same level of direct influence on politics and there’s a greater commitment to crack down on corruption. In regional terms, Indonesia enjoys greater clout and has attracted the attention of international partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom and China. Recent participation in RAAF-hosted Exercise Pitch Black 2012 (see image) shows Indonesia’s willingness to engage with partners such as Australia by sending their newest aircraft to build person-to-person ties and to dispel doubt as to their military intentions.

Barring a significant change in Indonesia’s trajectory of growth and domestic transformation, this is likely to become an enduring externality for Australian policy. Nonetheless, it’s worth thinking through the factors that could cause problems for Indonesia down the track: these include slowed growth, a change of leadership to one that is more internally focused, and deteriorating domestic stability. The question is whether these eventualities would adversely affect the Indonesia–Australia relationship in the long term or would merely slow the engagement temporarily. That said, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia seems to be on an unstoppable path of growth. A nationalist President of Indonesia would be a concern but wouldn’t necessarily require a radical rewrite of Indonesia’s place in our strategic interests. In any case, as one RSIS commentator notes (PDF), nationalism at present is not a call for concern.

Likewise, Australia can cause ructions over livestock, people smuggling or the incarcerations of Australians, but the fundamental shared interests should ultimately prevail. In terms of shifting regional geopolitics, Australia and Indonesia might have more in common in the future Asia as we both navigate China’s rise and the US rebalance. A Defence Cooperation Agreement signed recently between Australia and Indonesia provides a framework for practical cooperation on common security matters, but it’s time to work together as well on bigger, long-term strategic questions about the region.

Indonesia demands different handling in the next Defence White Paper, which is as much an opportunity as the Asian Century White Paper to correctly recognise Indonesia’s place. Language matters, because it sends a strong signal to both the Australian and Indonesian people about how we see each country’s place in the region. And while the majority of everyday people in each country may not delve into the pages of the White Paper, setting the tone for political interaction as well as doing away with ambiguous language remains important. Hopefully the 2013 White Paper will articulate Indonesia’s importance and elevate it to partner status rather than a subordinate. That sort of constructive language would remove the disparity between language of the 2009 White Paper and the increasing importance of close defence relations and alignment of strategic interests between the two nations.

The White Paper might start by recognising the complementarity across our capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. Or it could, as Hugh White suggests, create a heading for Indonesia separate from the rest of ‘our neighbourhood’ to recognise the important role it plays in our strategic environment. While there’s no prospect of an alliance between our countries in the foreseeable future, it would provide a more robust basis in our national policy to give a broader context to initiatives such as the recently signed Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Defence Minister Smith assures us that he is ‘committed to regular, open and transparent discussions with Indonesia on the development of Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper’. Let’s hope the final cut pays them the same due respect.

Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

This post originally appeared at The Rogue Adventurer.

On October 2^nd the armed wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين‎), the al-Quds Brigades, took to the streets of Fatah in Southern Gaza to mark the 17^th anniversary of the assassination of Fathi al-Shaqaqi. Shaqaqi was assassinated in Malta by the Mossad in 1995. Each year, the al-Quds Brigades take to the streets for a military parade to mark the event, brandishing a variety of arms and carrying all manner of banners and flags. This year’s parade, however, was a little different, and held some interesting items for those of us following the spread of various small arms. Amongst the usual assortment of Russian AKMs & Eastern Bloc copies, Chinese Type 56 variants, PKMs, and RPG-7 variants and copies were two far less common weapons: the F2000 and AK-103 assault rifles.

The F2000 Standard, as seen here, is manufactured only by FN Herstal of Belgium, whilst the AK-103 is predominantly manufactured by the Russian state-owned Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant (IZHMASH). Neither of these rifles would ordinarily be expected to turn up in Palestine, and certainly not in the hands of a designated terrorist organisation such as PIJ. Where then, might such weapons have come from? The F2000 is in very limited service in Pakistan, and 55,000 rifles were sold to the Saudi Arabian National Guard in 2005. Neither avenue of supply appears likely. The AK-103 is in use in limited numbers in Morocco, and is thought to be in limited service with Iranian Takavaran naval commandos. Whilst PIJ has some pretty strong links to Iran, sending a handful of foreign-purchase weapons in place of locally-produced or previously stockpiled (cheaper) weapons would seem an unusual choice for them to make.

The AK-103 and the F2000 do not typically turn up in the hands of the same fighting force (an exception to this rule may, occasionally, occur in India). There has been one recent conflict however, where precisely this has happened – Libya. These two weapons were used concurrently by both parties to the conflict, in fact. AK-103-2 rifles were found in the hands of pro-Qaddafi (and later rebel) fighters; these were manufactured in Russia and possibly served as precursors to a deal to produce such weapons locally. 367 F2000 Standard assault rifles, meanwhile, were known to have been exported by FN Herstal to Libya in 2009. They were intended for use by the elite 32^nd ‘Khamis’ Brigade, and were later captured by rebel fighters and put to use against regime forces. The F2000 rifles seen in Libya were sold and equipped with FN Herstal underbarrel 40x46mm grenade launchers, known as the LG1. The F2000s pictured in Gaza also sport LG1s.

Much has been written about the threat of arms proliferation in the wake of the collapse of the Qaddafi regime. The UN Security Council has heard from the United Nations Inter-agency Assessment Mission to Sub-Saharan Region that “Governments in the region are faced with… the smuggling of weapons from Libyan stockpiles”. IPS news quoted a former rebel as saying ““All of the militias are involved in selling weapons. There is no law in Libya, still no functioning government, and the country’s security forces are too weak to control the situation, so selling weapons is regarded as legal by many of the rebels”. Whilst much of the international community’s attention has been focused on the threat of Libya’s MAN Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), small arms such as these assault rifles are responsible for 60-90% of worldwide conflict fatalities each year.

So, have assault rifles from the Libyan conflict ended up in Gaza? The PIJ only appear to possess a few of each rifle, in keeping with a limited proliferation profile expected of weapons deemed prestigious by Libyan rebels. Whilst 7.62×39 and 5.56×45 calibre cartridges (for the AK-103 and F2000 rifles, respectively) are both reasonably common in Gaza, it is worth noting that no 40×46 grenades can be seen accompanying the LG1 grenade launchers in these photos. Both rifles would certainly be of use to PIJ, however tactically they would hold little advantage over any other serviceable assault rifle in the hands of guerrilla fighters. With the comparatively low level of marksmanship training that such militias have, these rifles won’t give them much of an edge. The exception may be the LG1 modules, if ammunition for these is readily available in Gaza. Whilst this is definitely more of a symbolic victory for them – modern assault rifles perhaps giving the appearance of a more effective force – the question of where such arms came from merits further investigation. Of course, without inspecting the weapons in question it is impossible to determine their true origin. We cannot even tell, from these photos, whether these AK-103 rifles are AK-103-2 models or not. Regardless, it is certainly strange that both would appear in images from Gaza at the same time.

Damien Spleeters, Belgian freelance journalist and arms researcher, has an excellent piece (focusing on the F2000) available here. This piece was front-page news in Belgium, and explores how such weapons may have ended up in Gaza, and what the Belgian government can do to assist in tracing such misappropriation of weapons produced in their country. There is further commentary on his blog.

The Group for Research and Information on Peace and security (GRIP) first commented on the F2000’s presence in Gaza.

Thanks to Will McCants for his assistance in adding a little context to the photos. 

The photo was taken from the PIJ al-Quds Brigades website. 

Of the Defence issues raised over the past 12 months, none has been more controversial than the government’s decision to lift a ban on gender discrimination in the military which means women are eligible to serve in close combat units, including special forces.

In Australia, we value the principles equality and fairness and the right of the individual not to be discriminated on the basis of race, religion, age or gender. But there are specific challenges to applying a rights-based approach to the profession of the arms. This is because there are strong historical and cultural legacies surrounding ideas of the military, warfare and masculinity.

Historically, the military and warzones are not imagined and understood as a context for women as soldiers. Australian women appeared in support roles such as nurses, drivers, workers, mothers and later carers of returned soldiers. In this sense, gender reform is not just about enshrining the equal rights for women in the military but must, over time, break down traditional, cultural and historical understandings of warfare, the military and masculinity.

This is challenging because in the military, while the individual is important, the “group” (that is, the military) and survival of the nation and its interests are paramount. Resistance towards women in combat has focussed on an assumption that there will be degradation of physical standards and hence overall force effectiveness. But provided women can meet the physical requirements for the role, there should be no reason this would be problematic.

Yet further objections to women in these units include their being a threat to cohesion. That is, women will be a source of distraction, causing sexual competition between male soldiers and create added liability as male soldiers protect their female counterparts before others. In this way, women are framed as an undesirable inclusion that undermines the profession. This is part of the challenge introducing a rights-based approach in the military as cultural acceptance of equal treatment between men and women must catch up to legal changes.

Some have argued that there’s little point to enshrining equal opportunity in the military. As the argument goes, few women would pass combat corps physical tests so there would be a disproportionate increase in cost. These costs could include upgrading facilities to accommodate both genders, adjusting living quarters in submarines, providing more medical services specific for women’s needs, and developing new body armour, amongst other requirements. In Canada, despite having combat arms open to women since 1989, combat troops count only 3.8 per cent among its ranks (some put the figure of women in combat roles as low as two per cent). And while women have been eligible to apply for selection in New Zealand’s elite special forces unit, the Special Air Service, none so far have been successful. It is likely that Australia will also not attract a large proportion of women in close combat roles.

However, this is not just about numbers. Costs are a consideration, but for a society that values and upholds rights, cost inefficiencies are recouped by the broader gains. Promoting fairness and equality in Australian society is an achievement that is less easily measured, but is necessary and valued.

It doesn’t help that some see lifting the ban on women in combat as a purely political measure taken by Defence Ministers. The perception that gender reform was politicised makes wider cultural acceptance of women in the military more challenging. If women are qualified and willing to undertake combat roles, they should also be given every chance to succeed. This means preparing for the implementation of gender reform by acknowledging the practical challenges like cost and infrastructure and proceeding in spite of the political motivations.

Another issue to consider is that, in spite of women’s eligibility for all roles in the military, those in close combat are seen to be valued more than those in non-combat or support roles (this has been reflected, for instance, in patterns of military promotion). And the same applies for men. Part of breaking down ideas of masculinity and soldiering also involves valuing the contribution of men in non-combat roles in the military. This point has often been elided in discussion about gender and the ADF but is important to the debate.

The military has already taken some steps towards implementing gender reform. All jobs in the military will be based on merit with all candidates required to pass gender-neutral physical tests. These tests are based on corps-specific tasks so Infantry candidates must complete a casualty drag simulating a combat situation whereas Combat Engineer candidates must lift heavier weights simulating the equipment used (the author received this information during a September visit to a Reserves unit). In the past, there were different physical standards for men and women in an attempt to recognise the physiological differences between the genders and increase the recruitment of women. This will be instrumental in breaking down ideas about women as weak and vulnerable but time is also needed to normalise and further legitimate the idea of women working alongside men in close combat roles.

Overall, Australia is a fair and progressive country and we should continue to push forward for gender equality. It will take the will and hard work of select groups of women in close combat roles, and the assistance of the ADF and the community, to mitigate (but not eliminate) the perceived risks of promoting women’s rights in this field.

With Australian, Canadian, British, American, New Zealand, Danish, Norwegian and Dutch forces in combat roles in conflicts including Afghanistan and Iraq, women have been on the ‘’frontline” and have found themselves inadvertently in close combat circumstances. There is no shortage of data and information to collect from both male and female operators about their experiences that can be used, in supplement to principles of equality and fairness, to shape our policymaking in pragmatic ways.

The elimination of gender discrimination will go some way in reforming parts of Defence culture. And ultimately, one day the idea of the soldier will resoundingly also include women.

Natalie Sambhi is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and editor of ASPI’s blog, The Strategist. The views expressed here are her own.

This article was first published by the online human rights magazine Right Now as part of their September focus on women’s rights and is available here. Image courtesy of Flickr user US Army.

KOPASKA was influenced by USN Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) and US Navy SEALs, and has roughly similar operational responsibilities, including maritime counter-terrorism. Their insignia features a winged frog and anchor device, and their motto is “Tan Hana Wighna Tan Sirna” (“there is no obstacle that cannot be overcome”).

Defence notes: “Exercise Kakadu 2012 is Australia’s largest maritime exercise and allows the RAN to develop operational capability and skills in a coalition environment. Exercise Kakadu will be conducted from 29 August to 14 September in the Northern Australian Exercise Area off the coast of Darwin.  In 2012 there will be 15 ships, and over 2000 sailors and officers from 17 participating and observing nations taking part”

Photo credits: Department of Defence